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RECENT DECISIONS
Bills and Notes-Status of the Transferee of Fraudulently Se-
cured Instruments Under N.I.L. 54: On September 13th and 16th,
one Sauer, president of S & S Motors, Inc., fraudulently obtained ten
negotiable notes, totaling $33,094.76, from Motors Acceptance Corp.
On September 16th, plaintiff bank, at Sauer's solicitation, exchanged
for the notes its draft in even amount on First National Bank of Chi-
cago. The same day, Sauer deposited the draft, presumably to the ac-
count of S & S Motors, with La Salle National Bank of Chicago. On
September 18th, Motors Acceptance Corp. discovered the fraud, ad-
vised plaintiff of this fact, and plaintiff ordered the drawee of its draft
to stop payment.
Between September 19th and October 15th, negotiations ensued be-
tween the Waukesha Bank, S & S Motors, La Salle National and
Motors Acceptance. On the latter date, plaintiff, pursuant to demand of
La Salle Bank, directed its drawee to honor the draft, and La Salle
was paid.
Plaintiff sued Motors Acceptance on its notes. The parties stipulated
the facts, the trial judge interpolating this statement:
• . if in the opinion of the court it becomes necessary in
order to determine the issues in this case that evidence be
presented concerning the accounts and records of S & S Motors,
Inc., in the La Salle National Bank of Chicago, Illinois, and
any transactions and dealings between said La Salle National
Bank, S & S Motors, Inc., and the parties hereto the attorneys
for the respective parties will be notified and will be given an
opportunity to produce whatever evidence is admissible in rela-
tion thereto.1
On appeal by Motors Acceptance from an adverse judgment, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court affirmed, First National Bank of Waukesha v.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 44, 112 N.W. 2d 381 (1961).
The critical issue of the case was whether or not, under the provision
of N.I.L. 54,2
Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the in-
strument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same
before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid therefor, he
will be deemed a holder in due course only to the extent of the
amount theretofore paid by him,
plaintiff was entitled to enforce payment of the notes as a holder in due
course. 3 Defendant's contention was that, because plaintiff was aware
I First National Bank of Waukesha v. Motors Acceptance Corp., 15 Wis. 2d
44, 112 N.W. 2d 381 (1961).
2 WIs. STAT. §116.59 (1959).
3 N.I.L. 57, Wis. STAT. §116.62 (1959), "A holder in due course holds the in-
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of the fraud when plaintiff lifted its earlier countermand and caused
its draft to be honored, plaintiff could qualify as a holder in due course
only if its liability to La Salle Bank on the draft had theretofore be-
come absolute. But, argued the defense, the latter liability was not abso-
lute unless (or except to the extent that) La Salle Bank was a holder
in due course of the draft. Finally, the defense contended, it was incum-
bent on plaintiff to establish the due course status of La Salle, under
N.I.L. 59,4 as an element of its case on the notes.
Regarding the question as one of first impression,5 and conceding the
existence of respectable differences of judicial opinion, the Court re-
jected the defendant's initial premise:
We prefer... to adopt the construction that the quoted phrase
["paid therefor the full amount agreed to be paid"] means com-
pletion of the transaction at hand, which in the instant case was
when plaintiff exchanged its draft for the 10 notes.7
It further added:
In the instant case, sec. 116.59, Stats., would be applicable
only if the plaintiff had received notice of the fraud before it
had finished the particular settlement agreed upon for the ex-
change of the 10 notes. Here the settlement was complete when
plaintiff gave its bank draft.8 [Emphasis added].
The so-called "bank deposit" cases9 were distinguished. Under their
rule, a bank, which gives a deposit credit in exchange for an item sub-
ject to a prior infirmity, is entitled to recover on the item only to the
extent that there was an actual withdrawal of funds prior to notice to
the bank of the infirmity. 10 The rationale for this "bank deposit" rule
strument free from any defect of title or prior parties, and free from de-
fenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment
of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable there-
on."
4 WIs STAT. §116.64 (1959), "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a
holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who
has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to
prove that be or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a
holder in due course ... "
5 Supra note 1, at 48, 112 N.W. 2d at 383. "This issue has never been squarely
before this court."
6This phrase is the crucial portion of N.I.L. 54, WIS. STAT. §116.59 (1959),
set forth in the text, supra note 2.
7First National Bank of Waukesha v. Motor Acceptance Corp., supra note 1,
at 48, 49, 112 N.W. 2d at 383.
sId. at 49, 112 N.W. 2d at 383.
9 Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326, 110 N.W. 192 (1907); First National Bank v.
Court, 183 Wis. 203, 197 N.W. 798 (1924) ; Northfield National Bank v. Arndt,
132 Wis. 383, 112 N.W. 451 (1907); Curry v. Wisconsin National Bank, 149
Wis. 413, 136 N.W. 549 (1912).
10 Strictly speaking there need not be an "actual" withdrawal. If the depositor's
account varies from the time the initial credit was given, the FIFO test may
apply in determining to what extent the bank is a holder in due course. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that the depositor's present account balance ex-
ceeds the amount of the defective instrument, the bank may still be a holder
in due course, to the extent it previously paid out money to or on account of
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is obviously sound. Upon learning of the infirmity in the instrument it
has taken, the bank can readily return the item to its depositor and
revoke the deposit credit.11 Thus to the extent that a bank so circum-
stanced may readily mitigate its own loss, by resort to the deposit in its
own hands, it is denied recovery against the original defrauded party,
even on negotiable paper.
The Court's ground of distinction, as stated in the principal case, is
not entirely satisfying:
Clearly the equities are not the same where the bank gives its
own negotiable instrument in exchange for another. For now the
bank's instrument may get into the hands of a holder in due
course.
12
The question remains: What are the respective equities if the instru-
ment given in exchange has not, in fact, come into the hands of a holder
in due course? A literal application of the "completion of the transaction
at hand" theory makes this factor immaterial; for once a party has
issued a negotiable instrument in exchange for another, there would
appear to be no subsequent circumstance which could defeat or impair
the rights of such party.
It requires little ingenuity to suggest any number of circumstances
which ought, it would seem, to bear substantially on the case. Certainly,
had Sauer himself reappeared with the draft, after his fraud had been
disclosed, payment directly to him would have been such a circumstance.
The inherent logic of the "bank deposit" rule would suggest the same
result had Sauer determined, e.g., on September 16th, to deposit the
draft with the Waukesha Bank in an account opened on that day. The
same reasoning would apparently apply to any payment of the draft to,
or specifically for the account of, either Sauer or S & S Motors.
the depositor. Since ,part of the present balance may be the result of valid
deposit items, only the amount of the balance still attributable to the de-
fective instrument will be cancelled under the "bank deposit" rule. See First
National Bank v. Court and Northfield National Bank v. Arndt, supra note
9 for a further discussion of the FIFO rule; also see BRIToTN, BILLS AND
NoTEs §97, at 393 (1943).
11 See Port Washington State Bank v. Polonia Phonograph Co., 180 Wis. 71,
192 N.W. 472 (1923), which applies the "bank deposit" rule in denying holder
in due course status to plaintiff bank. Polonia found no equity in a bank
which, with full knowledge of the infirmity in a deposited item, nevertheless
permitted both the item and subsequent deposits to be applied to subsequent
withdrawals.
In First National Bank v. Court, 183 Wis. 203, 197 N.W. 798 (1924), by
contrast, "The defendant at no time during the trial submitted evidence tend-
ing to prove notice of the fraud to the plaintiff .... Therefore the presump-
tion that it purchased in good faith . . . continued until overcome by re-
butting evidence." Id. at 213, 197 N.W. at 801.
The Court decision gave unstinting recognition to the "doctrine that the
presumption of application of payments does not apply where it will work
injustice." Id. at 211, 197 N.W. at 801.
12 Supra note 1, at 48, 112 N.W. 2d at 383. This statement is the same as that
set forth in BarrroN, BILLS AND NoTES §98, at 401 (1943).
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In each of these suppositions there lurks the fundamental objection
to any suggestion of the principal case that the status of La Salle Bank
was immaterial to Waukesha National's right of recovery. If La Salle
Bank had not been, in fact, a holder in due course then it is perfectly
conceivable that it may have been no more than a depositary or collect-
ing agent of Sauer. Payment to it, under these circumstances, would
hardly be more defensible than payment to Sauer himself.
It is the writer's feeling that a better solution was overlooked, by
rejecting Jerke v. Delmont State Bank" on the ground that it construes
"paid" in N.I.L. 54 to mean actual cash payment. In actuality, the ferke
case accords completely with the Wisconsin Court on the question of
whether or not Waukesha National had "paid" for the notes prior to
learning of the fraud. This is evidenced by its analysis of holder in due
course:
When the holder of a negotiable instrument, fraudulent in its
inception, has established together with the other elements of
holding in due course specified in (N.I.L. 52) that he gave for
the instrument a consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract,'14 he has certainly established that he took the instrument
for value within the meaning of subdivision 3 (N.I.L. 52),5 and
he has met the burden of proving that he "acquired the title as a
holder in due course" specified in (N.I.L. 59) .16 [Emphasis
added] .17
The essential difference between the two decisions lies in the respec-
tive degrees of finality attributed to the holder in due course status of
the plaintiff bank. Whereas the majority opinion in the First National
case makes this the sole criterion for allowing recovery, the Jerke case,
while not denying the prima facie significance of this factor, qualifies
the conclusiveness of the right of recovery stated in N.I.L. 57.18
Some confusion has arisen in the cases by sometimes overlooking
the fact that in a suit upon a negotiable instrument by the
holder against the maker, the fact that the holder acquired the
instrument as a due course holder does not dispose of all the
rights or equities between the parties to the action. . . . Due
13 54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929).
14N.I.L. 25, Wis. STAT. §116.30 (1959) provides: "Value is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt
constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on
demand or at a future time."
'5 N.I.L. 52, Wis. STAT. §116.57 (1959) defines holder in due course. "A holder
in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions: 1. That it is complete and regular upon its face; 2. That he be-
came the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had
been previously dishonored if such was the fact; 3. That he took it in goodfaith and for value; 4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." [Emphasis added].
l Supra note 4.
17 Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, supra note 13, at 595.
is Supra note 3.
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course holding has nothing whatever to do with direct rights or
equities between the holder and the maker and subsequent equities
may arise, which render it impossible for the holder to enforce
payment of all or part of the note, entirely regardless of the fact
that he acquired it in due course .... 19 [Emphasis added].
Justice Currie's dissent20 in the instant case attempted to provide
for the same considerations in a slightly different manner. He felt that
the bank, in stopping payment on the draft, reversed the prior completed
transaction and thereby left open the questions of whether the draft
was held by a holder in due course at the time of the stop payment order.
This was precisely the point argued by the defendant in seeking a re-
versal. In so doing defendant relied heavily on the Terke case. Even if
the Wisconsin Court had adopted the position taken in the Jerke case,
it is questionable whether Motors Acceptance could have prevailed, be-
cause of the lack of any evidence indicating that First National knew
La Salle Bank was not a holder in due course at the time it counter-
manded the stop payment order. The burden of showing such participa-
tion in the fraud is clearly upon the party relying on N.I.L. 54,21 Motors
Acceptance Corp. The following excerpt from the Jerke decision pre-
cisely explains the burden of proof problem:
If, after knowledge of the original fraud, the bank paid the cer-
tificate of deposit ... knowing that such holder was not a due
course holder, then to that extent [N.I.L. 54, Wis. Stats. 116.59]
would apply and because of such knowing breach of constructive
trust, the bank would not be "deemed a due course holder" as
against Jerke, regardless of the fact that it actually was a due
course holder. But the burden of proving the existence of this
supervening equity, arising out of the breach of constructive
trust after becoming a due course holder, was upon the maker
of the note. The burden placed upon the holder by [N.I.L. 59,
Wis. Stats 116.64] is limited to showing the acquisition of title
in due course. That section does not place upon the holder any
burden of going further, and negativing the existence of super-
vening equities, which may have arisen upon subsequent facts in
favor of the maker. If any such supervening equities exist, it is
for the maker of the note to prove the same by the preponder-
ance of the evidence.
22
Since N.I.L. 5923 presumes every holder to be a due course holder,
the determination of La Salle's status would be unnecessary in the
absence of any evidence by Motors Acceptance that La Salle was not
such a holder in due course. Therefore, to remand the case for a new
trial would be allowing reconsideration of an issue nlot pleaded.
19 Supra note 13, at 595.20 Supra note 1, at 51, 112 N.W. 2d at 384.2 1Supra note 2.
22 Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, supra note 13, at 596.
23Supra note 4.
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The impact of the present case will undoubtedly produce a different
aproach by parties seeking to avoid liability on fraudulently secured
negotiable instruments. The decision has effectively cut off any possi-
bility of defending successfully against the holder who took the instru-
ment in good faith and in exchange for a negotiable instrument.
But when a fact situation arises involving an exchange of negotiable
instruments, where one is subject to a prior infirmity, the following ap-
proach may be useful in setting up a valid defense, assuming the possi-
bility that the Wisconsin Court will modify its flat rejection of the Jerke
rationale. Unless the transferee knew of the fraud at the time of the
exchange, his right to recover should not be questioned by merely
asserting N.I.L. 54, or by questioning the transferee's holder in due
course status. Rather, the defendant should proceed to establish:
1. The point in time at which the plaintiff was aware of the infirmity;
2. That plaintiff's negotiable instrument was subsequently paid to one
not a holder in due course; and most important,
3. That plaintiff knew the payee was not a holder in due course.
In essence the defendant would be arguing the supervening equity
of the situation, 24 and denial of recovery would be predicated upon the
plaintiff's participation in effectuating the fraud, irrespective of his due
course status at the completion of the original transaction.
MICHAEL R. WHERRY
Wills-Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence in the Absence of
Ambiguity: The wills of Mr. and Mrs. George Gibbs each be-
queathed one per cent of the residue to "Robert J. Krause, now of
4708 North 46th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin." Robert W. Krause,
who resided at 2325 North Sherman Boulevard at the time the will
was executed, petitioned the County Court for. Milwaukee County
for construction of the above provisions on the ground that he was
the intended beneficiary. Both Robert J. Krause of 4708 North 46th
Street and Robert W. Krause were represented at the hearing. The
petitioner was permitted to introduce evidence that he was a close
friend and former employee of the decedents, over the objection of
the named beneficiary. He was also allowed to show that in prior
24 In Home Savings Bank v. General Finance Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 417, 103 N.W.
2d 117 (1960), the Wisconsin Court allowed a restitutional recovery to a
plaintiff who relied upon the oral acceptance of a sight draft. N.I.L. 132,
Wis. STAT. §118.07 (1959), requires a bill of exchange to be accepted in
writing. Yet the Court felt that the inequity of the situation justified relief
even though the plaintiff was seemingly barred by the express wording of
the N.I.L. It is interesting to note that principles in another field of law,
restitution, took precedence over the more particular area, negotiable in-
struments.
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